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Since individuals demanding formations of new parties face a collective action problem, I 
inquire why people form new parties, and why this political strategy became increasingly 
popular between 1973 and 2002 in Swedish municipalities. Case-studies indicate that ‘strong 
emotions’ – i.e. anger, frustration and indignation – mobilize rational actors to start up new 
parties. However, ‘strong emotions’ only explain why individuals form parties in the first 
place, not why party formation has become a popular strategy. Hence, I hypothesize that 
entrepreneurs forming parties at t inspire potential entrepreneurs in neighbouring 
municipalities at t + 1. Since previous attempts to explain the increasing number of new 
parties in Sweden have failed, I maintain that the support the hypothesis gains adds 
important knowledge to this field.  
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  21. Introduction
1
As Olson (1971: 15) points out, the provision of public goods is the function of organizations 
generally. Since political parties are organizations, this implies that when political parties are 
formed, everyone can benefit from the new party’s efforts without contributing to its 
formation or even voting for it in public elections. Through their participation in councils, 
parties influence the production of a range of public goods. Once a political party is on its 
feet and working, the efforts of the parties’ activists automatically become available for 
everyone else, since all policies political parties can force through, influence or veto, affect 
society as a whole. 2  
 
That political parties supply public goods has important, yet often overlooked, implications 
(e.g. Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1970: 105). Because individuals who form political parties 
(in essence party entrepreneurs) solve a collective action problem, not every potential political 
organization materializes. As Olson (1971: 2) puts it:  
 
Unless the number of individuals is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other 
special device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested 
individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interest. 
 
In the case of party formation, this is an accurate description since individuals who wish to 
see a new political party formed face an N-person prisoners’ dilemma (e.g. Nownes and 
Neeley 1996): 
 




  Form a new party  Refrain from forming a 
new party 
Engages in the party
formation project
 




Prefers the least 
(4) 
 




Prefers the most 
(1) 
 









Table 1 shows the conflict between individual and collective rationality and explains why 
not every potential political organization materializes, even though there might be 
widespread public dissatisfaction with existing political parties or a general will amongst 
large segments of citizens in a society that a new political party is needed. Individuals 
                                                 
1 This paper has benefited from comments of Jerker Moodysson, Jan Teorell and Liam Weeks.  
2
 This way of conceiving political parties also mirrors Lavers (1997: 71) term political services: ‘The notion of 
political services includes the direct provision of public goods but in addition encompasses the provision of more 
general political regimes that facilitate the production of public as well as other goods and services that might 
otherwise be available only suboptimally […] The outcome is the resolution of collective action problems as a 
result of the provision of what I am referring to here as ‘political services’. This line of argument is implicit in 
Tullock’s (1971: 917) reasoning (i.e. ‘When [the voter] casts his vote in the public market, he is producing a public 
good’), and can also be found in the works of Downs (1957: 137), Olson (1971: 15), McCulloch (1990: 499) and 
Whiteley et al (1994: 80).  
  3wishing to see a new party formed are expected to reason like this: ‘Whether or not I engage 
in forming a new political party, one of two things will happen. Either enough other 
discontented people will form a new party, or not enough will. If the first thing happens, I 
will be able to reap the fruits from the efforts of the party entrepreneur, without having to 
invest (and risk) my money, time, energy, and social status. If the second thing happens, my 
investments in the project would have been wasted.’ Ergo, it is better for the whole group 
that wishes for a new party to be formed if some individuals organize it, but best for each to 
refrain from this strategy (cf. Elster 1989: 126). 
 
Therefore scholars committed to rational choice make the following prediction: No matter 
what other citizens do, it is in the individual citizen’s self-interest to refrain from the strategy 
of party formation. A reasonable expectation is that individuals prefer investing their time, 
money, energy, and social status in other projects than a relatively high cost and high risk 
activity such as party formation.3 And as if this initial collective action problem is not 
enough, groups that somehow overcome free-rider problems face additional hardships. 
Firstly, voters often find it hard to coordinate on new political alternatives, hence new parties 
have difficulties attracting enough votes to gain representation in councils (Golder 2003). 
Secondly, the market for votes is already occupied by well organized, resourceful and 
politically experienced actors. Since the market for votes is a zero-sum game established 
parties are not expected to treat newcomers on the scene kindly (Lipset and Rokkan 1967: 30, 
61; see also Detterbeck 2005; Katz and Mair 1995).4 For a number of reasons then, party 
emergence appears to be puzzling events in need of explanation. 
 
State of purpose 
Between 1973 and 2002 the number of new, non national parties5 elected to Swedish local 
councils (kommunfullmäktige) increased dramatically. Only about one fifth of the councils had 
a new party represented after the 1973 election. After 2002, new parties were represented in 















                                                 
3 When forming a new party, you have to invest much time in the project. In most cases you will have to risk your 
private financial resources. In addition, you face a close scrutiny of your private life when the party is launched. 
Furthermore, most party entrepreneurs experience harsh words, and even outright harassment, from 
representatives from the established parties. As if this is not enough, you certainly cannot count on getting 
enough electoral support to gain representation to the council you run for, once investments have been made and 
the party has been formed. It therefore seems fair to file party formation under ‘high cost and high risk projects’. 
4 In Erlingsson (2007) there is a detailed discussion on the difficulties party entrepreneurs face. 
5 By ‘new political parties’, I refer to parties that never had representation in the national parliament. 
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The cumulative line shows that 75 percent of the municipal councils have had – at one time 
or another – a non national party represented. In fact, approximately 370 new party 
organizations have been around throughout the whole period (see the appendix in 
Erlingsson 2005).6 Since individual party formations are puzzling, this development is 
remarkable.  Despite predictions, not only does the occasional new party emerge – in 
Swedish local politics, party formation has also become an increasingly common strategy. 
The purpose of this paper is therefore to answer two questions:  
 
•  Why do individuals form new political parties in the first place? 
•  Why did party formation become an increasingly popular strategy in Swedish 
municipalities? 
 
Notes on methodology and outline 
A combination of methods is employed. To answer the first question, the general story 
behind individual cases of party formation is described. Three in depth case studies, chosen 
according to a ‘most different’-strategy, are conducted. By mode of ‘process tracing’, the 
purpose is to examine if there is something universal to the party formation narratives, i.e. if 
some general mechanism explains the decisions of party entrepreneurs. To answer the 
second question, I use quantitative techniques to examine if ‘imitation’-mechanisms explain 
why this strategy has become more common. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In part two, a brief review of the dominating theoretical 
approaches is made, and I argue that they are unsatisfactory points of departures for my 
purposes. In part three, I search for mechanisms responsible for the individual 
entrepreneur’s decision to form a party. In part four, I proceed by searching for explanations 
for party formation becoming an increasingly popular strategy 1973–2002. Finally, in part 




                                                 
6 Several scholars have examined if municipalities where new parties have gained representation have something 
in common. The results are depressing: No structural variable increases the probability for emergence of new 
parties (e.g. Wörlund 1999; Lodenius 1999: 166; Petersson et al 1997: 71; Johansson and Schmidt 1983). 
  5 
2. Dominating Approaches 
eories employed here are preferred, a brief survey of the 
•  Institutional explanations: formal rules, such as electoral systems, shape incentives for 
•   response to value 
•  ons: failures in established parties explain party formation. 
 
will briefly review the general logic behind these approaches and argue why they are 
nstitutional explanations 
 rely on Duvergers (1954) law: due to coordination problems 
his is all fine. However, for the purposes at hand, these results are not useful. Institutional 
emand-oriented explanations 
icularly suited to explain changes over time within the 
                                                
To justify why the methods and th
dominating perspectives on party emergence is made. Although theory development has 
been scant, a fair amount of studies have tried to explain the number of political parties in 
party systems and/or party emergence. I argue that the dominating and most popular 
theoretical approaches are roughly divided in three main categories: 
 
potential party-entrepreneurs, and hence explain party formation. 
Demand oriented explanations: new parties are expected to evolve in
change among citizens.  
‘Existing supply’ explanati
I 





in strategic voting, electoral systems applying plurality rule in single member districts will 
tend towards having two large parties. On the other hand, the more proportional (PR) the 
electoral systems are, the larger the numbers of political parties are expected to be found. 
These predictions find evidence (e.g. Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1994; Farrell 
1997). Willey (1998) uses this argument to explain party emergence, and finds that new 
parties are more prone to emerge in PR-systems with large district magnitude, while PR-
systems with small districts tend to have stable party systems.  
 
T
hypotheses are primarily capable of explaining spatial variation at one point in time. The 
purpose of this paper, however, demands a theory capable of handling changes over time, 
within the one and same political system. For the institutional perspective to be able to 
explain why party formation became a popular strategy 1973–2002, one would have to show 
that relevant institutions at the local level have undergone changes between 1973 and 2002 so 
party formation has become (a) less costly, (b) easier and/or (c) more lucrative. As it turns 
out, this is not the case (Erlingsson 2005: ch. 4).   
 
D
If institutional theories are not part
one and same political system, ‘the demand-oriented perspective’ is practically tailor-made 
for this task. Many scholars relate to Inglehart’s (1990) studies on post-material values to 
explain why new parties emerge.7 The mechanism works something like this: citizens’ values 
underwent major transformations throughout the post-war period. There was a shift from 
materialist values (desire for physical and economic security) to post-materialist values 
(desire for freedom, self-expression and quality of life) There is ample evidence showing that 
such a transformation really has taken place. However, it is the next step in the argument – 
 
7 Inglehart has, to my knowledge, never explicitly analyzed party emergence, although a hypothesis along this 
line of this reasoning is suggested in Inglehart and Flanagan (1987: 1300f). 
  6that value change automatically generates parties based on post-materialist values (i.e. 
neoliberal, environmentalist or feminist parties) – that is troublesome.  
  
There are at least three reasons why this perspective is unattractive for the tasks at hand. 
Firstly, empirical research has refuted its viability. Harmel and Robertson (1985: 516) not 
only showed that it is ill suited to explain the emergence of new parties in general (for 
example, it has a hard time explaining the emergence of right-wing, anti-system or populist 
parties) – but it also does not even make the emergence of so called post materialist parties 
comprehensible. Similar discouraging results are found elsewhere (e.g. Budge et al 1987: 391f; 
Laver and Hunt 1992: 55; Ware 1996: 20, 48). Furthermore, Fridolfsson and Gidlund (2002) 
reached the conclusion that the post-materialist hypothesis has little or no relevance in 
explaining party emergence in Swedish municipalities. Secondly, the perspective has 
theoretical problems: it does not take into account that established political parties are able to 
control the political agenda and adapt to changing preferences in the electorate (e.g. Mair 
1983). This counteracts the predictions made by the demand oriented perspective. Thirdly, it 
does not take into account that, since political parties are producers of collective goods, 
groups demanding political parties face a collective action problem. The lack of micro-
foundations, which could help make the decisions of individual party entrepreneurs 
intelligible, makes the supply-oriented perspective unattractive for the purposes at hand. 
 
‘Existing supply’ explanations 
It is hard to disregard this perspective’s premise because it is so intuitive – the premise of 
course being: ‘new parties emerge when established alternatives fail’ (e.g. Hauss and Rayside 
1978; Lawson and Merkl 1988). This is also a recurring theme in the new-institutionalist 
literature where, for example, Ahrne and Papakostas (2001) claim that the inertia of old 
forms of organizations is the precondition for the emergence of new ones. The failure (or 
unwillingness) of old organizations to change and adapt to new demands opens up spaces 
between all existing, established organizations, and these spaces – in turn – may become sites 
for new organizations.8  
 
However, at least two important objections to this perspective can be raised. Firstly, since its 
premise is so intuitive, it also borders on being tautological. Logically, if the organizations 
already occupying the market for political parties are (a) perfectly adaptive to changes in 
voter preferences, do (b) fully canalize the demands of the electorate to public decisions and 
(c) do handle public resources optimally, there would be no reasons for individuals to form 
new parties. Secondly, micro foundations are absent, and the perspective is therefore silent 
about the motives of the party entrepreneur. Even if established parties fail (do not adapt to 
changing preferences, do not canalize demands to public decisions, and do not handle public 
resources optimally), with the consequence that a demand for a new political party arises, 
there is still no real good reason for individuals to invest their money, time, energy and 
social status in the high cost project of forming a new political party. The free-rider problem 
appears again. Therefore, we need a theory that highlights the role of individuals and tries to 
make the motivation of party-entrepreneurs intelligible. The ‘existing supply’-perspective does 
not provide this.9
                                                 
8 One can argue that too much adaptation has similar effects. If parties quickly abandon long established 
standpoints on policy issues and challenge the party’s core values, it can contribute to a loss of votes in the party’s 
core constituency.  
9 One of the few scholars who takes micro foundations seriously, and truly remedies the neglects in the ’existing 
supply’-perspective, is Hug’s (2001) game theoretical approach to party emergence. 
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Summary 
The main mechanisms explaining party emergence, examples of research employing 
each perspective, and the limits and inadequacies of these alternatives, are 
summarized in table 2. 
 
Table 2. Snapshot-view of the literature on party emergence.
  Explanation Relevant  studies  Limitations 
The institutional 
perspective 
’Rules of the game’, i.e. 
electoral systems, 
determine the number of 
parties in a given party 
system. 
Lijphart (1994), Farrell 
(1997), Willey (1998). 
Evidence: in cross-
national comparisons, this 
mechanism explains the 
number of parties in given 
systems. 
Does not handle processes 
(developments over time) 
or the fact that new 
parties emerge in systems 
that do not change their 
‘rules of the game’. 
The demand-oriented 
perspective 
Citizens are increasingly 
adopting ‘post-material 
values’, hence, new 
parties emerge in 
response to new demands 
made on the political 
system. 
Relates to Inglehart (1977). 
Evidence: tests of this 
hypothesis do not find 
convincing empirical 
support (see Harmel and 
Robertsson 1985; 
Fridolfsson and Gidlund 
2002). 
Poor empirical support, 
does not handle the fact 
that established parties 
adapt to new 
circumstances, cannot 
solve problems posed by 




New parties emerge when 
the old, established ones 
fail to channel demands 
and opinions and/or fail 
to manage collective 
resources in a satisfying 
way. 
Dates at least back to 
Hauss and Rayside (1978), 
but is systematically 
developed in Lawson and 
Merkl (1988). Evidence: 
Often cited 
commonsensical 
explanation in public 
debate; often referred to in 
case-study research. 
Is silent about the micro-
level, i.e. the party-
entrepreneur; gives no 
good understanding as to 
why someone would step 
forward to solve collective 
action problems. 
 
Although some of these arguments are relevant, their shortcomings do not qualify them as 
theoretical points of departure for the empirical investigations. This said I now turn to my 
own way of approaching the two research questions: Why do individuals choose to form 
new parties in the first place? Why did party formation become an increasingly popular 
strategy between 1973 and 2002? 
 
3. Why Do Individuals Form Parties? 
Looking back at the ‘paradox of party emergence’ in the introduction, what motivates an 
individual to step forward and form a new party? The costs are known beforehand, and they 
are certain. Compared to other forms of political participation these are high. The rewards, on 
the other hand, are not clear and are uncertain – the entrepreneur does not know if his new 
party will gain enough votes to reach representation in council. Ex ante, party formations are 
puzzling circumstances in need of explanation. 
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The ‘analytical narrative’ 
To answer questions about the motivations of individual entrepreneurs, case studies are 
employed. Attention is turned to three cases and I describe the processes which preceded the 
individual entrepreneur’s decisions to form the party. By comparing the respective 
entrepreneur’s paths to the decision, I strive to illuminate general mechanisms that enhance 
our understanding as to why individuals choose to form new political parties. This mode of 
procedure is inspired by a fairly recent debate within sociology and political science among 
scholars that have attempted to bridge the gap between inductive and deductive research 
strategies. Abbott (1992), Griffin (1993), Abell (1993) and Kiser (1996) have all argued that 
scholars conducting case studies without ambitions to generalize are mistaken and need to 
pay more attention to theory. Even single case studies must have guidelines for how the 
cases should be analyzed, or else we run the risk of delivering custom-made ad hoc 
explanations.  
 
To avoid these pitfalls, a framework inspired by the concept ‘analytical narratives’ (Bates et al 
1998) is developed and applied to the cases. Creating an ‘analytical narrative’ entails 
combining theoretical assumptions with a close-up contextualization of the analysis. As 
Kiser (1996) argues, it is reasonable to use rational choice as general theoretical point of 
departure for narrative analysis, since it provides a ‘deep structure’ to the narratives, hence 
facilitating explicit discussion of individual motives for action. Also, rational choice is 
apposite for narrative analysis since it facilitates the incorporation of features stressed by 
scholars in the narrative genre: micro level action, events, temporality, and path dependence. 
 
When constructing the universal analytical narrative, expectations about the sequences that 
precede party formations in general, need to be formed. Hug (2001: 36) describes such general 
sequences that seem to be common to all party formations, and his descriptions work as 
good starting points for the model that will guide my analysis of the cases: At the outset, 
someone is unhappy about some political issue(s). This person somehow attempts to voice 
his/her demands in one way or another. When these demands face rejection by the 
establishment, a potential for party formation exists. This simple universal model for party 
formations resembles Hirschman’s (1970) frameworks which discusses the strategies of exit, 
voice  and  loyalty: processes of potential party formation start out with some individual 
(whether he is a member of an established party or not) who is unhappy with the status quo. 
But what can (s)he do about it? (S)he can choose to: 
 
A. Be silent and loyal to the established order. The story ends right here. 
 
B. Exit and resign from all attempts to bring about change. The story ends right here. 
 
C. Protest/voice and make demands to change the established order. The story 
continues. 
 
If the individual chooses action (A) or (B), the representatives of the established party do not 
have to react. However, if the individual voices, protests and makes demands on the 
established order, the representatives from the relevant concerned established parties need 
to choose either of these actions: 
 
1.  Accept the protest and satisfy the demands. The story ends right here. 
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2.  Ignore the protest and continue business as usual. The story continues. 
 
If the party accepts the protest and satisfies the individual’s demands, the story ends right 
there. The party adapts to the internal pressures for change, the protesting individual is 
socialized and life goes on. However, if the party ignores the protest, it forces the individual 
to act once again. And again, (s)he has three options: 
 
A1. Accept the failure and be loyal to the established order and act if nothing has 
happened. 
 
A2. Make a ‘silent’ exit, i.e. leave all attempts to change the established order behind. 
 
A3. A combination of ‘exit’ and ‘protest’/‘voice’, i.e. form a brand new political party 
that represents the new demands.  
 
Three cases of party formation are analyzed with this model (i.e. the ‘analytical narrative’ or 
‘the universal story of party formation’).10 The presentation of the three cases is structured 
around three crucial moments on the entrepreneur’s path to the party formation decision:  
 
-  The diverging demand 
-  The clash with the established party system 
-  The decision to form the new parties 
 
The diverging demand 
John Görnebrand was an active member of the Centre party throughout the 1960s. 
Görnebrand had always been a fierce critic of the Swedish universal welfare state, and made 
no secret of this contempt in public (e.g. Görnebrand 1970a and 1970b). Görnebrand worked 
intensively to put his views on the public agenda, and he proposed very neo-liberal, market-
oriented solutions to these problems (which in the early 1970s had very few adherents in 
Sweden). His demands actually diverged from all established parties in Sweden at that time. 
The ideas that stood out most from the mainstream were demands to liberalize the alcohol 
policy, to drastically change the social policy and to get rid of the VAT on food. 
 
In the early 1980s, Agne Andersson and Kurt Andersson were members of the Moderate 
party in the municipality of Båstad. After attempts to present some new ideas to the party’s 
local leadership, Andersson and Andersson, became more and more disappointed at – what 
they thought - the group of ‘conservative colonels, mayors and lawyers’ (Arnhult 2004) that 
had controlled the party locally since the mid 1970s. There was personal antagonism 
between Andersson and Andersson and this older conservative group, and the local 
leadership was not willing to grant Andersson and Andersson eligibility to important 
positions in the Moderate party’s council list before 1988’s election. Aside from mere 
personal collisions, there were also ideological discrepancies. Andersson and Andersson 
wanted, for example, to make investments in tourism and the local trade and industry; and 
                                                 
10 The cases have been chosen according to a ‘most different strategy’ considering two variables: when the party 
was formed, and what kind of politics they represent. The parties are: Kommunens väl (neoliberal party formed 1973; 
splinter from the Centre party); Bjärepartiet (liberal party formed 1988; splinter from the Moderates) and 
Törnman’s Kirunapartiet (a leftist party with a Social Democratic agenda formed 1994; splinter from the Social 
Democrats). 
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conservative, Moderate leadership. 
 
Lars Törnman used to be a renowned union leader – nationwide in Sweden in general, but 
particularly locally in Kiruna – in the late 1980s. He had always been a supporter of the 
Social Democrats, and in the 1980s even very active with some public functions in Kiruna 
municipality. Also, he was a particularly popular figure among his fellow miners. Actually, 
Törnman did not really have a political agenda that diverged from the Social Democrats 
(indeed, he always said he was a ‘true’ Social Democrat [Arbetaren 1995 nr 11]). However, his 
views challenged the interests of the local Social Democratic leadership. Törnman was 
angered over how the local Social Democratic leaders handled their mandate. Among other 
things, they had been involved in a couple of high-profile corruption scandals. So what 
Törnman demanded was renewal and restructuring inside the local Social Democracy. 
Specifically, he wanted a better functioning internal democracy, and practically, this should 
be done by substituting some of the older corrupted individuals with fresh, young faces on 
the ballot list before the 1994 election.  
 
The clash with the established party system 
How did these individuals – Görnebrand, Andersson and Andersson, and Törnman – try to 
gain sympathy for their demands? Görnebrand used at least three different strategies. First, 
he wrote polemical articles in the daily press. Second, he published the book Socialbyråkratin 
[The Social Bureaucracy] (Görnebrand 1973) where he dismissed almost all elements of the 
Swedish welfare states. Third, he tried to find support for his neo-liberal agenda within his 
own Centre party by (a) writing a letter to Thorbjörn Fälldin (national leader of the Centre 
party) presenting his suggestions (Görnebrand 1972b) and (b) trying to create a network of 
neo-liberals within the Centre party11 (Görnebrand 1972c; 1972d). However, the party leader 
(Fälldin 1972) dismissed Görnebrand’s suggestions completely, and rejected his ways of 
perceiving the problems with the welfare state. Also, on the face of it, his strategy to build a 
network of neo-liberal individuals within the Centre party seems to have failed (Görnebrand 
2004). 
 
What happened to Andersson’s and Andersson’s demands within Båstad’s local Moderate 
branch? When they realized they were not up for any meaningful positions before the 1988 
election, they decided to create a splinter list consisting of themselves and eight other 
oppositional, i.e. liberal, Moderates (Nordvästra Skånes Tidningar 14.01.1989). However, this 
alternative splinter list was never approved by the Moderate party centrally. Ergo, the 
Moderate leadership – locally, regionally and nationally – viewed it as illegitimate. In spite of 
this, the splinter list gained enough votes for Andersson and Andersson – and four others on 
the list – to receive seats in council. And in council, the representatives of the splinter list 
decided to neglect the agreements the ‘proper’ local Moderates had made with the People’s 
party and the Centrum Democrats in Båstad. Andersson and Andersson decided to 
circumvent all of the local Moderates’ internal procedures and negotiate with the Centre 
Party and the Social Democrats. This ‘coup’ provoked not only an outcry from the ‘proper’ 
leadership of the local Moderates (Nordvästra Skånes Tidningar 17.12.1988a; Nordvästra Skånes 
Tidningar 17.12.1988b) – but also triggered many acts of harassment against Andersson and 
Andersson in their private homes. But this did not stop Andersson and Andersson from 
continuing to make settlements with the Centre Party and the Social Democrats on a more 
liberal policy concerning trade and industry, and local tourism policy. This made the rift 
                                                 
11 In these letters, Görnebrand actually went as far as to write that he desired to create ‘a party within the party’. 
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of the ‘proper’ Moderate party on the other, complete. 
 
Törnman says that his only wish was to renew the Social Democrats by asking them to give 
new, younger people the chance to have influence on the party’s local policy agenda: ‘I just 
wanted to see new faces in Kiruna’s Social Democracy’ (Törnman 2003). In other interviews 
he has stated that: ‘the present municipal board needs to go away, they have worn out their 
public confidence’ (Dagens Nyheter 03.03.1994) and ‘the town hall needs to be tidied up and 
democracy has to be introduced’ (Norrbottens-Kuriren 01.03.1994). So what did he do to make 
the Social Democrats listen to his demands about renewal? His plan was simple enough. He 
knew that he personally had huge popular support among the public in general and the 
miners in Kiruna in particular. Therefore, he never actually planned to form a new party. 
Instead, he was convinced that just his threat to form a new party would make the leading 
Social Democrats cave in to his demands (Expressen 19.09.1994; Göteborgs-Posten 26.09.1994). 
So, to threaten to form a party if they did not appease his demands is what he did. 
 
The decision to form the new party 
Before the 1973 election, Görnebrand had tried to put his definitions of the problems of the 
Swedish welfare state on the agenda by writing polemical articles and publish a book on the 
topic. He had also tried to make way for his views within the Centre Party. All of these 
strategies failed. When he later explained why he formed his party Kommunens Väl (which 
later changed their name to Centrum Democrats with national ambitions) approaching the 
1973 election, he complained about the Swedish consensus tradition and the Centre Party’s 
decision to participate in the huge fiscal reform in 1970. ‘Such settlements’, Görnebrand 
wrote ‘do not belong in open democratic and parliamentary systems’ (Görnebrand 1976). It is 
obvious that his failure to gain an ear for his demands provoked deep discontent within him. 
In one polemic article before the 1973 election he wrote:  
 
Our established parties – which have jointly created a puffed-up, bureaucratic and 
overprotective society – cannot be trusted. They are impregnated with a mentality that declares 
adults incapable of managing their own affairs. A new, young party needs to be created to 
radically clean up the weeds that suffocate new thoughts. 
 
After several attempts to manage his way through the Centre Party, he seems to have made 
this decision for at least three reasons: he (i) was disappointed, bitter and angry after the bad 
treatment he felt he got from the leader of the Centre Party and disillusioned after his failed 
attempt to create a ‘party within the party’; (ii) saw a market for new parties when polls 
showed that over 25 percent of the voters had not decided which party they should vote for 
(quotes in Görnebrand 1972a); and (iii) felt that party formation could be a viable strategy, 
since Glistrup had had success with this strategy in the neighbouring country Denmark, 
ergo, he seems to have been inspired by earlier pioneers in the party formation business (cf. 
quotes from Görnebrand in Blekinge Läns Tidning 27.04.1974; Ystads Allehanda 10.05.1975). 
 
What about Andersson and Andersson in Båstad? After 1988’s election, the Moderate party 
found themselves in a peculiar situation: Together with the People’s party and the Centrum 
Democrats, the party gained council majority and had an agreement that involved building a 
coalition and rule together. However, six of the Moderate members of council were elected 
via a splinter list. These six – with Andersson and Andersson at front – decided to negotiate 
with the Social Democrats and the Centre Party instead, in order to be able to carry out their 
liberal agenda. Hence, the ‘proper’ representatives of the Moderate party were overrun and 
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could not accept this situation. So six months after the election in 1988 – and after attempts to 
reconcile the fractions within Båstad locally – the Moderate party decided to move for an 
exclusion of Andersson and Andersson (Nordvästra Skånes tidningar 14.03.1989), and on 5 
June 1989 this decision was executed (Nordvästra Skånes Tidningar 06.06.1989). However, the 
following day Andersson and Andersson declared that they did not intend to leave their 
seats to any ‘proper’ Moderate representative, and Agne said: ‘If we aren’t allowed to work 
within the party, I guess we’ll just have to work outside it then’ (Nordvästra Skånes Tidningar 
07.06.1989). Bjärepartiet was officially formed on 5 July. His explanation for the decision is 
simple: ‘If you can’t get support for your ideas within the group of people you identify 
yourself with, well, then you have to do something about it. In Sweden you always have the 
right to form a new party’ (Arnhult 2004). When asked about why he managed to continue 
with his political activism, despite fierce criticism from Moderate party officials and 
anonymous harassment in his private life, he said he got a kick from the harassment, and 
that a lust for revenge and to prove his antagonists wrong drove him to the decision to form a 
new party.   
 
When Törnman (Arbetaren 1995 no 11) explains his decision to form Kirunapartiet 
approaching the 1994 election, he says: 
 
I took for granted that they [the leading Social Democrats in Kiruna] were fully aware of 
my public popularity, that my threat to form a new party would scare them so that they 
would bring at least three or four new faces on the list… but hell no! They just further 
cemented the party organization. And then, there was not much else for me to do. I just had 
to form the new party. 
 
Obviously, he felt obliged to form the new party after he had threatened to do it and when 
the Social Democrats did not appease his demands, there was not much choice other than to 
actually create it (Törnman 2003). In interviews directly after his decision he said that his 
only purpose with the formation of Kirunapartiet was to reform the corrupted local Social 
Democratic party in Kiruna and for a transitional period act as a ‘deputy’ real  Social 
Democratic party in the local politics of Kiruna. He actually said: ‘We are a Social Democratic 
alternative and our ballot list should be seen as a pure splinter-list’ (Norrbottens-Kuriren 
15.04.1994). How should his decision be interpreted? Well, what drove him seems to have 
been (i) frustration over the fact that the local Social Democrats actually did not pursue a 
Social Democratic policy; (ii) anger over the fact that these Social Democrats refused to listen 
to the demands he put on them, and (iii) fear of losing social status if he did not form a new 
party when the Social Democrats would not appease his demands. Here, one could also add 
a fourth reason: in interviews Törnman has said that his decision to threat the leading Social 
Democrats with the prospect of him forming a new party was inspired by feminist Maria-Pia 
Boethius’ threat to form a feminist party in the early 1990s, if established parties would not 
put female candidates higher up on their ballot lists (demands that actually were carried 
through, hence Boethius never had to realize her threat). 
 
What triggers individuals’ decision to form new parties? 
Can Görnebrand’s, Andersson’s & Andersson’s and Törman’s paths to the decision to form a 
new party tell us anything general about mechanisms that make party formation more 
intelligible? It is beyond doubt that all of them had policy goals they wanted to achieve. 
Görnebrand had his neo-liberal agenda, Andersson and Andersson wanted to give the local 
Moderates a more liberal profile and Törnman wanted to reform the local Social Democrats 
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risked their social status (all bear witness to harassment, loss of friends, and bad-mouthing 
from individuals within established parties). In addition, there really seem not to be any 
monetary incentives to speak of. So, simple cost-benefit calculations do not really make their 
decisions intelligible. Hence, we’re still stuck with the initial ‘paradox of party emergence’. 
 
‘But’ – maybe the inquisitive asks – ‘can’t policy goals explain the decisions to form parties’? 
I maintain this is neither a sufficient nor satisfactory explanation. It actually, once again, 
brings the problem of free-riding to the fore. One needs to know why they just don’t wait 
until someone else launches the neo-liberal party, the more liberal Moderate party or the 
reformed Social Democratic party, so that they themselves won’t have to invest (and risk!) the 
time, money, energy and status. In other words, one needs to know ‘what’s in it for them’, 
for the individual party entrepreneurs to engage in this high cost/high risk venture. 
 
But before the ‘what’s in it for them’-question is answered, the premise that party formation 
is a high cost/high risk activity must be discussed. True enough: to start up a new party 
takes time, costs money, risks your social status and will not with any certainty lead to 
council representation. However, if we look back at the cases, all party entrepreneurs have 
previously been engaged inside an established party. Ergo, they already come from a 
situation where they’ve invested a lot of time in political activity. So the step for them to 
form a political party, although big, is not as big as it would be for a person that had no 
previous political engagement. This of course helps to explain why the vast majority of party 
entrepreneurs have a past in some of the established political parties (see Eriksson 1999). 
 
That said, we are still stuck with the question about the party entrepreneur’s driving forces. 
The case studies indicate that something sets off, directs and accelerates the decision to form 
a new party. This something very well might be ‘strong emotions’. The entrepreneurs 
studied have all felt wronged; they have experienced disappointment, anger, frustration and 
indignation after their encounters with representatives from the established parties. I 
maintain that this is actually more significant than one might think at first glance; because 
the role emotions play in the decision-making process – especially when it comes to 
relatively high-cost decisions surrounded by uncertainty – have been documented in modern 
research on political participation. But in no means should ‘strong emotions’ be interpreted 
as opposite to rational behavior: As Damasio (1994) argues, emotions should be interpreted 
as prerequisites for rational behavior, in particular to mobilize energy to take action. Ergo, 
several scholars have started to merge thoughts about the role of emotions for political action 
into their theories on rational behavior (e.g. Hanoch 2002; Lawler and Thye 1999).  
 
With this theoretical framework in mind, how can the entrepreneur’s decision be 
interpreted? It could be argued that the established parties’ unwillingness to channel and 
adjust to internal criticism serves to heighten the opposition individuals’ anxiety, and in line 
with Marcus et al’s (2001: 11) reasoning, this leads them to search for alternative strategies to 
reach their policy goals. Bad treatment and infected encounters with established parties seem 
to provoke a will to obtain redress, which in turn becomes a psychological selective incentive 
that make entrepreneurs disregard simple cost-benefit calculations, hence overcome barriers 
for action and choose the high cost strategy of party formation (see also Gamson 1995: 90; 
Elster 1989: 64).  
 
Similar conclusions are found elsewhere in research on political participation. For example, 
Collins (1990: 43) writes: ‘the core of anger is the mobilization of energy to overcome an 
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analysis confirms the central importance of anger in collective action’. And when Reed (2004: 
656) studies high risk collective action in revolutionary Nicaragua, the conclusion is: 
‘[emotions] function as motors […] of revolutionary movement’.12 The results presented here 
are compatible with these findings in the relatively new literature on political action: ‘strong 
emotions’ – such as feelings of being wronged, disappointment, anger and indignation – 
seem to have mobilized Görnebrand, Andersson & Andersson and Törnman to overcome 
obstacles to choose the high cost strategy of party formation. Here, it is important to note 
that the ‘strong emotions’ in no way make their decisions irrational. Rather, I think, the 
emotions should be interpreted as accelerators which channel the entrepreneurs’ energy 
towards action instead of quiet resignation or defection from politics all together. Viewed this 
way, emotions should be understood as prerequisites for rational action.13
 
4. Why Did Party Formation Become an Increasingly Popular Strategy? 
In the previous section I proposed an answe r  t o  w h y  s o m e  p e o p l e ,  i . e .  ‘ t h e  p a r t y  
entrepreneurs’, step forward and – against theoretical predictions – form a new party. The 
mechanism identified – the accelerating force of ‘strong emotions’ – seems to make the 
individual party entrepreneur’s decision more intelligible. However, this answer only helps 
us understand the micro-question (why individuals form new parties) and is not too helpful 
when an answer to the macro-question has to be presented, i.e. why party formation became 
an increasingly popular strategy in Swedish local politics 1973–2002. 
 
How should one go about explaining the increasing number of new parties in Swedish 
municipalities? In section 2 above, I argued that existing popular approaches are inadequate 
to answer this question. We also know that previous attempts to explain this specific 
development – mainly tests of different structural variables – have failed (see footnote 4 
above). Furthermore, we know that the parties that have been formed vary much in 
character (they are everything from single-issue, to environmentally friendly, anti-
immigrant, purely genuinely local and ‘sub local’ parties). Therefore, it is motivated to focus 
on the strategy to form a party rather than anything else, and hence I choose to pursue a very 
particular line of inquiry which hasn’t been previously tested in this particular context. 
Remember that two of the entrepreneurs above, mentioned that they in one way or another 
were ‘inspired’ by party formations at earlier points in time.  Against this background I think 
it is worthwhile to examine if ‘rational imitation’ can help us understand why party 
formation became so popular.  
 
Two assumptions are central to the hypotheses I formulate. Firstly, the actors are rational, 
but are incompletely informed about the consequences of their actions (i.e. their decisions are 
made under degrees of uncertainty). Secondly, there is actor-heterogeneity in the population 
of potential party entrepreneurs: some need little information before taking action to form a 
                                                 
12 Although Renwick-Monroe (1996: xi) does not make a theoretical point of it, her study on why Germans – 
risking their lives and without rewards – helped Jews to hide and/or escape from the Nazis, is interesting in 
connection with this discussion on emotions and political action. When describing the actions of one of her 
interviewees – ‘Otto’ – she writes: ‘Why did he risk his life for others? “One thing is important”, Otto told me, “I 
had no choice. I never made a moral decision to rescue Jews. I just got mad. I felt I had to do it”’ (my italics). 
13 I believe that my interpretations of what’s going on can be merged with Schumpeters (1961) thoughts on the 
entrepreneurs’ role in economic life. Schumpeter maintained that monetary incentives were not the 
entrepreneurs’ main motivator. He believed that the joy of creating and the dream of building up a personal 
kingdom were the entrepreneurs’ selective psychological incentives. 
  15new party (these can be thought of as ‘risk-seeking entrepreneurs’), while others need to be 
quite sure that their decision to form a party actually leads to the desired consequences, and 
hence need much more information before taking action (these can be thought of as ‘risk-
averse entrepreneurs’). 
 
These assumptions suggest that an individual’s propensity to form a new party is a function 
of two things (cf. Hedström 1994: 1161f): it is partly dependent on characteristics unique to 
each individual (how much information he or she needs before taking action or how risk-
seeking or risk-averse he or she is), and is partly influenced by the actions of other actors in 
the relevant social system (i.e. how many others that have successfully applied the relevant 
strategy).   
 
To say that individuals’ actions are interdependent is, of course, commonsensical. Game-
theorists have always assumed that decision-makers try to form expectations about what 
other actors will do before deciding on a specific course of action. The argument put forward 
here, however, differs slightly from this standard way of reasoning. It is not just the game-
theorists credo (that decisions are affected by expectations about future action of others) that 
is repeated. What is added is that actors’ decisions are heavily influenced by the experiences 
other actors hace had in their social system at previous points in time. The concept ‘diffusion-
processes’ captures this phenomenon which Strang (1991: 235) describes as ‘any process 
where prior adoption of a trait or practice [or strategy] in a population alters the probability 
of adoption for remaining non-adopters.’ If one actor was successful using a particular 
strategy at an earlier point in time, this increases the probability that other actors adopt the 
same strategy later on.  
 
Diffusion-processes are made more intelligible when an individual level mechanism called 
‘rational imitation’ is introduced (Hedström 1998). Presumably, most individuals are driven 
by it, more or less consciously, in their everyday lives. The risks our friends, colleagues or 
complete strangers take – and the consequences they face from taking these actions – provide 
signals about which strategies are effective or ineffective, appropriate or inappropriate, 
successful or unsuccessful (e.g. Granovetter 1978; Schelling 1973). The core of the rational 
imitation mechanism is that other individuals’ experiences pass on useful information about 
the value of different strategies to us. 
 
Friedman and Hechter (1988: 215) make a case for this ‘rational imitation’-mechanism when 
they ponder on the relationship between the information available to actors and the 
strategies individuals actually choose. They ask us to consider a situation in which two 
individuals that are subjected to exactly identical structural constraints behave very 
differently. The authors then stress the importance of information in explaining outcomes: 
 
We can account for this by saying either that they have different preferences, or that they 
have different information about the consequences of their action. To claim that behaviour 
is explicable by reference to different preferences is tautological, and undermines the 
standard methodology of rational choice. The second explanation is more satisfying: the 
amount of information that agents have can affect behaviour independently of constraints or 
preferences. It may well be that information is the crucial intervening variable in all rational 
choice explanations. 
 
The conclusion, which is important for the purposes at hand, is that the supply of available 
information affects whether actors pursue a high-cost political strategy or abstain from it. The 
  16information actors have about the costs and benefits associated with a particular course of 
action determines if certain strategies become common or remain being exceptions. 
 
To put this more simply, in everyday life people say they were ‘inspired by’ and ‘influenced 
by’ others, or that they have ‘learned lessons’ from someone or something. Whatever we 
choose to call it, similar mechanisms are at work. The experiences other people have provide 
us with important information on the value of choosing a particular course of action 
(Hedström 1994: 1163). This information increases our certainty about the relationship 
between actions and their consequences: it tells us whether or not particular strategies lead to 
desired outcomes, if they do not, or if they have some unforeseen, negative side-effects. 
 
As Hedström et al (2000: 151, 168) make a case for, the imitation-mechanism is expected to be 
most prevalent concerning strategies that are characterized by high costs and uncertainty, 
when decision-makers have to make large investments but are unsure that their action will 
lead to the desired effect. Given this, it is reasonable to assume that the imitation-mechanism 
has good potential to explain why individuals choose the kind of ‘high cost/high 
uncertainty’-decision I focus on here, i.e. the decision to form a new party. But whatever the 
decision is, the underlying logic remains similar: The experiences other people make at 
earlier points in time reduce the uncertainty associated with the specific strategies involved. 
So, the information we get from people who successfully adopted a certain strategy, lowers 
our threshold for taking this course of action. 
 
This takes us back to the distinction made earlier, between ‘risk-taking entrepreneurs’ and 
‘risk-averse entrepreneurs’. It seems reasonable to assume that different individuals have 
different thresholds for when they think they have enough information to choose a certain 
course of action. For example, a person who starts up a new company in a completely 
unexplored market takes larger risks compared to the person who is the third or fourth to 
launch a company in this same market. The successful first entrepreneur provides 
information to other potential entrepreneurs that possibilities in this market indeed exist – 
and so others follow.   
 
Granovetter (1978) argues similarly. Some individuals are prepared to take high risks, are 
ready to make big investments and decisions without much information. These individuals 
can be thought of as genuine entrepreneurs (or pioneers) and they are risk-seeking. Others need 
to be quite sure that their investments in particular strategies will lead to the desired ends, 
and therefore take action only after they have gathered a relatively large amount of 
information. In relation to genuine entrepreneurs/pioneers, these individuals are imitating 
entrepreneurs (or followers) who are relatively risk-avert. The point of this distinction is that 
different individuals have different thresholds as to how much information they need, and 
how much uncertainty they are willing to accept, before embarking on a high cost political 
strategy such as forming new political parties. 
 
The conceptual toolbox has been introduced, and now a preliminary hypothesis can be 
formulated: party formation has become increasingly popular because imitating entrepreneurs 
are inspired by genuine entrepreneurs, and hence party formation at t increases the probability 
for party formation at t + 1 (e.g. Myers 1997: 96). How can this seemingly simple hypothesis 
be converted into empirical research? 
 
The spatial dimension of rational imitation 
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Hägerstrand found that people who adopted some technological innovation tended to have 
neighbours that were already using the same innovation. He generalized these results, and 
concluded that diffusion of innovation could be explained by communication processes (cf. 
Rogers and Shoemaker 1971: 178), the point being that what our neighbours do provides 
information about which strategies are successful and which ones are not (cf. Hedström 
1994). Several empirical studies have confirmed Hägerstrand’s expectations (e.g. Walker 
1969; Brown & Cox 1971; Collier and Messick 1975). Hedström (1994: 1159) puts himself in 
this tradition when he stresses the importance of information for explaining why people join 
social movements: 
 
[T]he social networks in which actors are embedded are likely to be of considerable 
explanatory importance […] because information about the movement, its costs and 
benefits, are spread through interpersonal contacts. 
 
Access to relevant information is a key variable in the construction of an empirically testable 
hypothesis that tests the explanatory power of imitation-mechanisms. One core premise is 
that information is diffused in social networks, and that the political strategies people in our 
network choose inspire us to take political action (or refrain from it).  
 
As Myers (1997: 7) points out, it is reasonable to assume that social networks are 
geographically concentrated. This assumption gains support by recent research in economic 
geography, which – despite all the technological advancements in communications and 
transportations – finds that face-to-face contacts, personal experiences, social proximity and 
interpersonal trust are still key factors in explaining the formation of cluster (e.g. Storper and 
Venables 2004; Bathelt et al 2004). These assumptions point in a particular direction, namely 
that the decision to choose the strategy of party formation is expected to be ‘contagious’ over 
short geographical distances.  
 
The first testable hypothesis can now be formulated. Municipalities that have new political 
parties represented in their councils are predicted to have neighbours that already have new 
political parties in their councils. Therefore a spatial diffusion of party-emergence in Swedish 
municipalities is expected: 
 
A. The spatial proximity hypothesis.  A geographic concentration of municipalities 
that have new political parties represented in councils is to be expected. When a 
municipality gets a new party, this municipality will have at least one neighbour that 
already has such a new party in its council. 
 
To further strengthen the suspicion that rational imitation is the actual causal mechanism, I 
also perform a tougher test for spatial and temporal proximity. Here it is important to find 
out when the neighbouring municipality was ‘infected’ by a new party to be more confident 
that imitation-mechanisms are actually at work (cf. Myers 1997: 97). This hypothesis 
demands that neighbours were ‘infected’ by a new party in the election directly preceding the 
one a municipally got a new party in council: 
 
B. The spatial and temporal proximity hypothesis. Individuals are expected to form 
new parties at time t + 1  in municipalities where a new party already gained 
representation in a neighbouring municipality in the directly preceding election at t. 
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given municipality increases if a neighbouring municipality already previously had a new 
party in the local council. The latter hypothesis, however, is a bit tougher because it demands 
that a neighbour got it in the election that directly preceded the one under examination. 
 
The units of analysis are Swedish municipalities. ‘Spatial proximity’ means that 
municipalities sharing a physical border are ‘neighbours’. ‘Temporal proximity’ means that 
when a party gains council representation in local council, this will affect the probability of 
party formation in a neighbouring municipality in the election that directly follows.14  
 
The spatial diffusion of party formation 
Before testing the two hypotheses, previous attempts to explain party-emergence in this 
specific empirical context need to be mentioned. A fair amount of research has been devoted 
to this question. Most of it has leaned towards various types of structural explanations. 
Interestingly, all have failed to find something that unites municipalities where new parties 
have entered local councils and good theoretically motivated correlations have been found 
(cf. Johansson and Schmidt 1983; Petersson et al 1997; Wörlund 1999). Therefore, it is 
motivated to uniquely focus on the explanatory power of the ‘rational imitation’ hypothesis. 
 
A fairly easy way to check if there is something to the hypothesis is to look at maps of 
Swedish municipalities for the 10 elections held 1973–2002. On each map I have indicated 
which municipalities got new party-representation in the current election, and also which 
municipalities had new parties since before. This way of proceeding will visualize any 
potential clusters and tell us if there is any potential in the imitation-hypothesis. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Note that the number of municipalities have varied between 277 and 290 (there have been secessions during the 
period researched). All in all, 10 elections are analyzed (this gives a sum of 1911 observations).   
  19Map 1. Shows when municipalities got a new party in the local parliament for the 
first time – for elections held in 1973, 1976, 1979, 1982 and 1985. 
  20Map 2. Shows when municipalities got a new party in the local parliament for the 
first time – for elections held in 1988, 1991, 1994, 1998 and 2002. 
  21The maps give an impression that some imitation might be going on. Put slightly differently, 
the maps give us no reason to reject the hypotheses. But does this visual impression, seen 
from a birds-eye view, hold for rigorous testing? A first, simple way to examine this is to 
examine whether the actual pattern of party-establishment is more clustered than a random 
pattern would predict. To compare actual  patterns with random  patterns more data are 
needed. These are distilled from a close analysis of the maps over party entry throughout all 
ten elections. These data are found in table 3. 
 
Table 3. Data to analyze spatial-proximity/clustering.
  1973 1976 1979 1982 1985  1988  1991  1994  1998  2002 
Total number of municipalities 
‘infected’ by new parties at present 
election 
52 57 76 69 74  67  86  115  143  151 
Number of municipalities that are 
‘infected’ by new parties in the 
present election. 
(52)  17  27  10  17  10 28 41 38 33 
 
Percentage of ’infected’ municipalities 
who have neighbours that have…  
               
 
a) in any earlier election got a new 
party represented or has a 
neighbour that got a new party in 
the present election 
[---] 65% 89% 80% 82%  80% 82% 90% 92% 97% 
 
b) in the previous election got a 
new party represented or has a 
neighbour that got a new party in 
the present election.  
[---] [---] 70% 40% 59%  60% 36% 71% 79% 70% 
 
Total number of municipalities 
that sometime has had a new party 
represented (the numbers above 
represent the cumulative count, 
the numbers below represent the 





























Percentage of these ’infected’ 
municipalities that… 
 
a) have at least one neighbour that 
is ’infected’ with new parties. 
 
b) are parts of clusters containing 
at least three geographically 
clustered municipalities. 
 
c) are parts of clusters containing 
at least four geographically 




































































































































In the early 1980s, Johansson (1982: 79ff) developed a tailor-made model to analyze imitation 
effects in Swedish municipalities. Through experiments, Johansson reconstructed describing 
how much clustering random processes would explain. Johansson ‘expected-value model’ 
answers the question: ‘if we randomly mark 50 Swedish municipalities on a map, how many 
o f  t h e s e  d o  w e  e x p e c t  t o  f o r m  c l u s t e r s  o f  a t  least two, at least three or at least four 




  22Figure 2. Expected value curves. 
 
 
Experimentally decided ’expected value’ 





Let’s apply Johansson’s tools to the data displayed in table 3. The results shown in table 4 are 
produced when comparing Johansson’s expected-value curves with actual results regarding 
whether or not municipalities have had new parties in their councils: 
 
Table 4. Difference between real and expected ‘neighbour-values’.15
      Difference in percentage points between actual 
and expected neighbour-values 
 
Year  Number of ’infected’ municipalities  a = 2  A = 3  a = 4 
1973  52  + 2  - 13  - 10 
1976  59  + 1  - 4  - 4 
1979  76  + 11  + 7  + 12 
1982  69  + 4  + 21  + 30 
1985  77  + 5  + 11  + 13 
1988  67  + 5  + 25  + 27 
1991  87  0  + 17  + 21 
1994  115  - 5  + 4  + 15 
1998  143 [---]  [---]  [---] 
2002  151 [---]  [---]  [---] 
 
Table 4 shows that hypothesis A gains initial support. If we look at the most allowing test (a = 
2, clusters of at least two municipalities), the actual pattern is generally higher than we 
                                                 
15  Elections 1998 and 2002 cannot be analyzed with Johansson’s ’expected value model’. When we pass 115 
‘infected’ municipalities, it becomes meaningless to analyze differences between actual and expected values, since 
the latter, as we can see from figure 5, are already so high. 
  23would expect randomness to produce. If we look at the tougher tests (a = 3 and a = 4, clusters 
of at least three or four ‘infected’ municipalities), the actual patterns perform worse than the 
experimentally expected pattern in 1973 and 1976 elections. Here, ‘infected’ municipalities 
are not so well clustered. However, from 1979 onwards, the cluster pattern kicks in. 
Subsequent elections support the suspicion that rational imitation-mechanisms might help us 
understand this phenomenon: the harder demands we place on clusters (i.e. high a-values = 
larger clusters), the more the actual pattern diverges from the expected ones. Overall, 
hypothesis A performs better than a pure random process. 
 
The test of hypothesis A suggests that it’s worthwhile to perform a tougher test and examine if 
rational imitation is responsible for the party formation strategy’s growing popularity. 
Hypothesis A gives us no reason to brush this suspicions aside; but it is not a satisfying test of 
the rational imitation mechanism A better test to say something about causality is to test 
hypothesis B: individuals are expected to form new parties at time t + 1 in municipalities 
where a new party already gained representation in the directly preceding election at t. 
 
What is now studied is how the ‘the first entry of a new party in council’ affects party entry 
in neighbouring municipalities. Such analysis demands instruments capable of handling 
dichotomies: either a municipality is ‘infected’ by a new party, or it is not. Since the 
dependent variable is dichotomous, the assumption of ‘normal’ regression analysis is a poor 
appreciation of the real relation between the independent and dependent variable. Hence, I 
apply a logistic regression model. The analysis is conducted on the same material as the in 
the previous section (i.e. elections in 277–290 municipalities throughout 10 elections). How 
well does hypothesis B perform? To get an overview of what the fi nal logistic model can 
explain, three models are presented in table 5: 
 
Table 5. Logistic regression: test of spatial and temporal proximity.





(With  diffusion added) 
Model 3. 
(With added diffusion and 
control for repeated events) 
 




















































Elections since the latest  ____________ ____________  .006 
  24new party entered  (.059) 
Number of earlier new 
party entries in the 
municipality  
____________ ____________  -.272 
(.196) 






Pseudo R2  0.045 0.057  0.059 
* Statistical significance: 0.1. 
** Statistical significance: 0.05. 
*** Statistical significance: 0.01.  
Explanation: Number of observations: 1911. The dependent variable is: existence of a new party (coded as 1) and non-existence of 
new party (coded as 0). Figures without parenthesis: Beta-coefficients; within parentheses, standard errors. 
 
Not that I only test the diffusion effect. Hence, in technical terms, this is a rather simple 
analysis. It does not control for other variables (cf. that ‘unemployment’, ‘political majority’, 
‘the state of the local economy’ etc. affects the probability of party emergence). There is an 
empirical reason that I opted for this: Since previous research has found no correlation 
between other variables and the existence of new parties, I find it worthwhile to examine 
what the rational imitation-hypothesis can come up with.  
 
In practice, model 1 just describes what we’ve already seen in figure 1; the coefficients for 
elections 1979–2002. Model 2 includes the diffusion-variable. The final model should be 
evaluated against this one. Here, we can see that diffusion has a significant effect. In model 3, 
however, I have made it a bit more difficult for the temporal proximity hypothesis by 
controlling for so called ‘repeated events’ (Allison 1982: 51ff), which entails controlling for if 
municipalities have an inherent propensity to ‘breed’ new parties, independent of what is 
going on in neighbouring municipalities. In the final model we actually see that diffusion is 
significant, and stronger, than in model 2. In the final model we also get the p-value 0.16. This 
measures what Long (1997: 75f) calls the ‘discrete change’, i.e. the expected change in probability 
for a new party entry in a municipality that previously had none, when the number of new parties 
in any neighbouring municipality increased from 0 to 1. 
 
Does this result add something new to our knowledge? Well, we do know that the result is 
significantly different from 0. But without previous research to compare with, there really is 
not much more that can be said. However, since support was found for hypothesis A using 
simpler measures, and since hypothesis B lends some, albeit weak, support, I think we cannot 
disregard the basic idea that imitation-mechanisms actually may be at work. If one thinks 
that my theoretical arguments are sound, and accepts that the support the basic hypothesis 
gains, I maintain that ‘rational imitation’ contributes to make the second research question 
intelligible. I think the key word is ‘support’ rather than ‘weak’ since previous research has 
not found any correlations that can be made intelligible by theory or intuition. Taking into 
account changes in infrastructure, media landscape, and information technology, one would 
expect that the proximity I here measure (i.e. sharing a border) would make less difference 
than it empirically does. This fact makes the results even more contra-intuitive, hence also 
surprising. 
 
5. Conclusions: Emotional Arousal and Rational Imitation Matter 
I started out by arguing that individual cases of party formation are puzzling, but despite 
theoretical predictions, party formation has actually become an increasingly common 
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when it comes to these phenomena by answering two questions: Why do individuals choose 
to form new parties in the first place? Why did party formation become an increasingly 
popular strategy between 1973 and 2002 in Swedish municipalities? 
 
The answer to the first question – indicated by three case studies – is that ‘strong emotions’ 
(i.e. feelings of being wronged, disappointment, anger, frustration and/or indignation) seem 
to trigger party entrepreneurs to overcome obstacles and form a new party. However, 
emotions alone cannot explain why party formation became an increasingly popular strategy 
between 1973 and 2002. When it comes to answering this second question, I showed that 
previous research has had a hard time explaining this development. Interestingly, two of the 
case studies indicated that party entrepreneurs might be inspired by party formations at 
earlier points in time.  
 
For this reason, I turned my attention to the argument presented in Hedström et al (2000: 151, 
168), i.e. that imitation mechanisms ought to be useful in explaining political participation 
characterized by high costs and uncertainty. Empirically, this was tested on an extensive data 
set (i.e. 277–290 municipalities in the ten elections held 1973–2002). As it turns out, there 
seems to be some support for the suspicion that the strategy of forming new parties is 
contagious. The fact that an entrepreneur forms a political party at an earlier point in time 
appears to inspire potential entrepreneurs in neighbouring municipalities to form new 
parties at a later point in time. Ergo, the contribution of this paper has been to highlight (a) 
the importance of ‘strong emotions’ in explaining high cost political participation that is 
surrounded by much uncertainty, and (b) the role ‘rational imitation’ or ‘learning 
mechanisms’ have, when it comes to explain why a certain kind of high cost strategy (i.e. 
party formation) becomes popular within a society. I by no means claim that these are the 
‘ultimate’ explanations, but rather, that they are good candidates when it comes to making 
the two puzzling phenomena under scrutiny here more comprehensible.16
 
                                                 
16 Note that the explanations I have presented here are compatible with a ‘push’/’pull’-model (see Erlingsson 
2005: chapter 7). ‘The push factor’ is related to the ‘existing supply perspective’ described in section two. Because of 
deteriorating internal democracy in established parties in Sweden (e.g. Gilljam and Möller 1996: 154f), members 
in these parties have found it increasingly difficult to voice demands and make political carriers within existing 
parties. People either quit their political activity all together (in fact, 300 000 – half of the total of about 600 000 
established party members quit their activity 1991–2005 [Petersson 2005]), or their activity finds new ways (for 
example, through party creation). ‘The pull factor’ is related to the ‘demand oriented perspective’ described in 
section two: Because citizens have become increasingly discontented with the performance of established parties 
and the politicians representing them (e.g. Holmberg and Oscarsson 2004: 249f; Möller 2000: 56), a market appears 
to have evolved throughout the past three decades for party entrepreneurs that wish to launch new parties, i.e. 
the party entrepreneur can put in his/her decision equation that there actually might be large segments of voters 
that potentially are open to vote for new party alternatives. However, I sincerely believe that the ‘push’/’pull’-
model is ‘only’ a necessary, albeit certainly not a sufficient condition for answering the research question posed in 
this paper. For a full understanding, the role emotions play and the rational imitation-mechanism, need to be 
incorporated. 
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